


Cooperative Autonomy for Contact Investigation



Massachusetts Institute of Technology



Toby Schneider

Henrik Schmidt

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Thomas Pastore



NATO Undersea Research Centre

Michael Benjamin

NUWC Division Newport



OCEANS '10 IEEE Conference: Sydney, Australia

Broad Problem

Terrorist threats against ships

- are real (USS Cole, Limburg, Somali pirates)
- can look like normal boat traffic
- are highly likely to occur in harbors



Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) offer a potential solution.
Relative to manned systems, USVs are:

- safe (no danger for sailors due to threat or rough seas in small boat)
- low cost
- scalable


Specific Problem: Scenario

Scenario:



- Ship at anchor or transiting at slow speed through harbor.



- Specified number of potential targets (“targets”) (normal small boat traffic) with arbitrary destinations within the harbor



- Specified number of USVs (“friends”) actively protecting ship
- USVs investigate targets approaching ship by cutting range to target and using on-board sensors



Specific Problem: Assumptions

Simulation Initial Assumptions:

- Ship radar is capable of accurately picking up targets
- Ship to USV communications are robust (though not necessarily high throughput)
- USVs have short range sensors for determining target's potential threat (video / still camera, lidar, etc.)
- USVs may have hailing system to warn away (accidental) intruders from ship


SCOUT USV



Software Architecture (MOOS)

Publish / subscribe infrastructure


- comprised of individual processes (“MOOS modules”)
- modules communicate through central database (MOOSDB)
- modularity allows contributions from many authors and incremental design




Autonomy Infrastructure (MOOS-IvP)

Behavior based autonomy

- Set of behaviors govern action space (heading and speed for USV)
- Each behavior generates an objective function -- function of utility over the entire heading-speed plane
- IvP Helm (pHelmIvP) optimizes over all running behaviors to choose mutually beneficial action.




example objective function



Cluster Defense Overview



Two behaviors and one MOOS module govern USV actions in this work:

- BHV_Attractor: seeks to draw vehicles towards targets.
- BHV_RubberBand: seeks to bring vehicles back to defense positions around ship.
- pClusterPriority: balances priorities for both behaviors in the context of multiple USVs / multiple contacts.



Autonomy: BHV_Attractor


- seeks to cut range to a target. An instance is run for every target
- objective function governs over heading



CPA: closest point of approach (USV \leftrightarrow target)


pwt: priority weight set by pClusterPriority

results presented: $r_1 = 0$ m, $r_2 = 100$ m, strength = 0.5



Autonomy: BHV_RubberBand

- seeks to station keep near a fixed point (assigned by `pClusterPriority`). one instance is run.
- objective function governs over heading and speed



CPA: closest point of approach (USV \leftrightarrow target)

results presented: $r_1 = 15$ m, $r_2 = 30$ m, stiffness = 2, pwt = 50

Autonomy: pClusterPriority

- prioritizes contacts based on closest point of approach
- rebalances individual BHV_Attractor priorities within the cluster of USVs

Overall Priority Prioritizes most threatening targets Encourages closest USV

$$A_{ij}(d_{ij}, \bar{d}_j, cpa) = A_0 \cdot C_j(cpa) \cdot D_{ij}(d_{ij}, \bar{d}_j)$$


$$C_j = \begin{cases} cpa_j \cdot \frac{C_{min} - C_{max}}{cpa_{cutoff}} + C_{max} & \text{if } cpa_j \leq cpa_{cutoff} \\ C_{min} & \text{if } cpa_j > cpa_{cutoff} \end{cases}$$

$$D_{ij} = e^{-\alpha(d_{ij} - \bar{d}_j)/\bar{d}_j}$$



distance from friend i to target j closest point of approach of target j to ship
mean distance of all friends to target j

Autonomy: pClusterPriority

- sets initial defense locations on evenly spaced points of circle around ship:




- rebalances USVs in case of loss (or addition) of one:



Autonomy: Combined Actions

Together these three pieces perform a task analogous to zone defense in basketball:

- Each USV investigates target(s) nearest to them and other USVs back off when another USV is near.
- When targets are not near or potentially threatening, USVs return to defense points and station-keep



Performance Evaluation: Qualitative


Successes:

- USVs investigate most targets of highest interest (heading close or directly toward ship).
- USVs usually do not overlap investigation at the expense of another target.
- System requires only knowledge of targets' and ship's <speed, heading, position> and friends <position>. No other data must be shared for autonomy to function.

Performance Evaluation: Quantitative

Targets outside “warning radius” are ignored. Targets within “danger radius” are scored:

- Score is an exponential based on *range to ship* at which target is first intercepted (farther is better).
- Perfect Score is interception at “danger radius”
- Interception requires a USV entering “intercept radius”



pScorer Results

description	vehicles station keep (baseline)	full system, 1 USV	full system, 3 USVs
defense radius (m)	300	300	300
number of USVs	3	1	3
max number of simultaneous contacts	10	10	10
time (hrs)	5	5	5
overall score (%)	19.3	23.5	26.8

Summary

The system presented here provides:

- Safe inspection of harbor traffic by autonomous vehicles.
- Behavior-based autonomy using “zone defense” analogy.
- Automatic prioritization of contacts.

Acknowledgments

- A. Vermeij, and many others who helped at the NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC)
- P. Newman for MOOS
- LAMSS: A. Balasuriya, K. Cockrell, S. Petillo

